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VICTIMS OF ABUSE IN SCHOOL
JENNIFER KwApIszt
INTRODUCTION
A mixture of rain and snow fell outside the window as nine-
year-old S.G. sat in her elementary school classroom on February
24, 2003.1 S.G. typically struggled in school, suffering from a
learning disability that made it difficult for her to reason and
communicate.2 At about 1:00 p.m. that day, a guidance
counselor, Ms. F., unexpectedly arrived at the classroom door and
called S.G. out into the hall.3 The counselor explained to S.G.
that someone was there to see her.4 Ms. F. then took her to a
conference room near the principal's office where a child
protective worker and a uniformed police officer were waiting.5
S.G. had no idea what to expect, but when she saw the two men,
she became scared-so scared that she started feeling ill.6 Ms. F.
placed her in the room and walked out, leaving her alone with
them.'
t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's
University School of Law; B.S., 2010, Fordham University. Special thanks to
Professor Jennifer Baum for her invaluable insight and support.
1 See Brief for Respondents at 1, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011)
(Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478); Weather History for Bend, Oregon, OLD FARMER'S ALMANAC
(Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.almanac.com/weather/history/OR/Bend/2003-02-24.
2 See Joint Appendix at 42, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478).
3 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 54.
' Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1017.
6 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 1-2.
6 Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 54.
1 Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1017.
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The caseworker then proceeded to question S.G. for more
than an hour about whether she was being sexually abused at
home.' S.G.'s parents were never notified that the caseworker
and the police officer were coming to the school or that an
interview was taking place.' S.G. would later say that she was
"too scared" to ask the caseworker questions or tell him that she
wanted to leave."o Although she initially denied being abused,
S.G. eventually started saying "yes" to everything the caseworker
asked because, as she revealed afterward, she was becoming
afraid that she would miss her bus home and believed that
answering affirmatively was the only way she would be allowed
to leave the interview.' When S.G. was finally allowed to leave,
she went home-only to find that the same two men were already
at her house, talking to her mother. 2 S.G. told her mother that
she felt sick and went to the bathroom." She vomited five
times.14
The caseworker, however, saw things differently. His name
was Bob Camreta, and he had been assigned to investigate
whether a nine-year-old girl-S.G.-was in immediate danger of
sexual abuse." The girl's father had just been arrested for the
alleged sexual abuse of a seven year old and then released on
bail." S.G.'s father had been allowed to return home, where he
had unsupervised daily contact with S.G. and her younger
sister." Camreta knew that sex offenders frequently molest their
own children and was therefore concerned for the girls' safety.'8
He also knew that if he went to speak with the girls at home,
their father could influence them. 9 With these possibilities in
8 Id.
I Id. at 1016-17.
10 See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 54-56.
11 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 3-4.
12 See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 49.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 43.
15 Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as
moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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mind, Camreta decided to interview S.G. in a different setting, a
familiar one where she would feel comfortable, but be free of
threats or coercion by her father.2 0 Camreta chose her school.21
According to Camreta, child protective workers in his agency
regularly conducted in-school interviews of children. 2  After
requesting the assistance of a police officer, Camreta went to
S.G.'s school and received permission to interview S.G. in a
conference room.23 A school counselor introduced Camreta and
the police officer to S.G. and then left.24 To make S.G.
comfortable, Camreta began by talking to her about topics such
as her school, home, pets, family, and homework.25 According to
Camreta, when he finally asked S.G. about her father, she
revealed that her father had been sexually abusing her for
years.2 6 Camreta concluded that S.G. needed protective services
and arranged for services to be provided to her and her family.
The case of S.G. demonstrates the competing interests at
stake during in-school interviews of suspected victims of child
abuse. Children, of course, have a strong interest in being free
from abuse. But they also have a strong interest in being free
from intrusive, traumatic questioning by strangers. 28  The
parents of such children have their own set of interests, which
include seeing their children's rights protected; preserving their
own rights, including their rights over their children; and
avoiding unwarranted investigations of child abuse. Such
investigations can severely harm parents' reputations and their
families. Child protective agencies, acting on behalf of the State,




23 Brief for Petitioner James Alford at 8, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020
(2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478).
24 Id. at 8-9.
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 10.
28 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle To Save the Children:
The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 413, 418-19 (2005) ("[Dlepending upon the child and the nature of the
investigation, the process [of investigating child abuse] can cause emotional and
psychological damage [to the child] ranging from temporary discomfort to significant
long-term harm.").
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However, this interest can only be defended when agencies have
the necessary investigative tools to discover that a child is in
danger.
These interests have increasingly conflicted as child abuse
investigations have become more prevalent. The number of
investigations in the United States has increased significantly in
recent decades, partly due to the introduction of mandatory
reporting laws. 2 9  About 3.3 million reports of child abuse,
involving over six million children, were filed in the United
States in 2008.30 Yet, only about twenty-five percent of these
children were determined to actually be victims of abuse,
suggesting that many children may needlessly undergo the sort
of traumatic questioning S.G. underwent, about abuse that never
occurred.3'
Child abuse investigations typically focus on activities taking
place inside the child's home, but may be hampered by several
impediments in that environment. Frequently, the abuser is a
member of the household. Approximately seventy-eight percent
of abusers are children's biological parents.3 2 As the caseworker
that interviewed S.G. noted, children within the home may be
subject to the influence of the abuser or other family members,
who may encourage or threaten the child to conceal the abuse.
Children may be too intimidated to answer questions honestly or
reliably in such a setting. Going to the home to investigate abuse
also notifies the abuser of the investigation, which may allow him
or her to take measures to hide the abuse.
Conducting interviews of thildren at their schools instead of
their homes can help overcome these impediments. In the school
setting, children are removed from negative influences at home
and thus may be more open and truthful with investigators. At
the same time, these children are still in a familiar setting, which
29 Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse
and Society's Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 824, 829 (2010) ("Annual reports
of child abuse increased 41% between 1988 and 1997 and rose another 15% between
1998 and 2007." (footnote omitted)).
3o Id. at 823.
31 See id. at 823, 829.
32 Id. at 826.
33 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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may further help to facilitate an interview. The suspected abuser
is also usually unaware that the interview is taking place and
therefore cannot interfere.
However, as effective as in-school interviews may be in
investigating abuse, these interviews nonetheless pose serious
concerns regarding children's Fourth Amendment rights.
Children, like adults, have a right to be free from unreasonable
seizures of their persons. When a child protective worker pulls a
child out of class to question him about suspected abuse, is this a
seizure? If so, can such a seizure be justified in the absence of a
warrant? On what grounds might it be justified? Clear
standards answering these questions are essential to ensure that
the interests hanging in the balance of these investigations are
adequately protected.
This Note argues that in-school interviews of children
regarding child abuse constitute seizures under the Fourth
Amendment and that such seizures are unconstitutional absent a
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Part I of this Note
provides a basic background of Fourth Amendment seizures and
discusses the Fourth Amendment's role in the context of child
abuse investigations. Part II examines the controversy
surrounding in-school interviews of suspected child abuse victims
and the implications of such interviews for children's Fourth
Amendment rights. Part III proposes a rule for in-school
interviews consistent with Fourth Amendment principles. It also
demonstrates how such a rule answers the Supreme Court's
questions about in-school child abuse interviews that arose in the
recent case of Camreta v. Greene,34 and how it may be translated
into guidelines for child protective agencies.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES IN CHILD ABUSE
INVESTIGATIONS
A basic background of Fourth Amendment seizures and their
application to child abuse investigations is necessary to examine
in-school interviews of suspected child abuse victims. This Part
provides that background by discussing what constitutes a
seizure and what is required before a seizure may occur. It
demonstrates how these requirements have been treated in child
3 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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abuse investigations. It then examines exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's general warrant requirement and the unique
considerations they raise in the child abuse context.
A. Background of Fourth Amendment Seizures
1. Defining Fourth Amendment Seizures
A threshold matter in determining whether an individual
has been subject to an unlawful seizure is determining whether a
seizure has actually occurred." A seizure is an "act or an
instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal
right or process."36 However, not every taking constitutes a
seizure.3 ' For a taking to amount to a seizure, the deprived
individual must have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
person or thing that was taken.3 8
When the seizure involves a person, courts must determine
the degree of interference with the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy.39 Courts have held that these
interferences amount to seizures when government actors have,
"by means of physical force or show of authority,. . . in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen."40 Restraints may occur in a
variety of contexts, including arrests, investigatory detentions,
interviews, and other stops.41 Actual physical restraint is not
required; courts consider a person to be seized if a reasonable
person in the same circumstances would believe he or she was
not free to leave.4 2
3 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a
Seizure: What is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619, 620 (1990).
36 BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (9th ed. 2009).
37 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989).
38 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also LEGAL INFO. INST., Fourth Amendment: An Overview, CORNELL
UNIV. L. SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edulwex/fourthamendment (last visited Feb.
26, 2013).
39 Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining this standard
in the general context of searches and seizures).
40 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
41 Clancy, supra note 35, at 621.
42 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
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2. The Requirements of a Lawful Seizure
One way in which the Fourth Amendment protects citizens
against unlawful seizures is by requiring seizing parties to obtain
a warrant supported by probable cause prior to the seizure.4 3
Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within
[the] knowledge [of government actors] and of which they had
reasonable and trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed."" A neutral
magistrate ensures that this standard is met before issuing a
warrant permitting a seizure.45
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, does not end
with the question of whether or not there was a warrant, because
the Fourth Amendment also separately states that individuals
should be free from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 4 6 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this separate clause to be distinct
from the clause containing the warrant requirement, allowing
myriad "reasonable" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement, including searches and seizures conducted
under exigent circumstances or during investigatory detentions,
searches incident to lawful arrests, and automobile searches.
3. Approaches to Seizures in Child Abuse Investigations
The Fourth Amendment inquiry deserves particular scrutiny
in the context of child abuse investigations. Child protective
workers are frequently accompanied by law enforcement officials
and undertake necessarily intrusive actions in order to
investigate child abuse.4 9  For example, investigations often
involve entering a child's home, interviewing the parents and the
child, examining the child's body, and even removing the child
from the home. 0 The need for such intrusive actions is not
always unreasonable; child abuse most often occurs in private
4 See OTIS H. STEPHENS & RICHARD A. GLENN, UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAw 9-10 (2006).
" Id. at 10 (third alteration in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
4 Id.
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47 STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 12-15.
4 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 416-19.
4 Id. at 415.
5o See id. at 414-15.
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settings, and both abusers and victims may go to great lengths to
conceal the abuse." However, the interests of child protection
must be balanced against the competing privacy interests of the
individuals involved; this is where Fourth Amendment analysis
52comes in.
Because of the importance of the privacy interests at stake in
child abuse investigations, courts have generally required a
warrant for searches and seizures conducted during these
investigations.53  By requiring a warrant, courts ensure that a
neutral magistrate-rather than an agent of the State
conducting the investigation-performs the delicate balancing of
interests and determines whether sufficient evidence exists tojustify intrusions into the privacy of the parents and the child."
However, although courts generally prefer state agents to obtain
a warrant before performing these investigations, child protective
workers regularly act in the absence of a warrant, raising serious
concerns about whether children's Fourth Amendment rights are
being adequately protected.55
B. Warrantless Seizures in Child Abuse Investigations
Those conducting warrantless child abuse investigations
have often defended these seizures under the various categorical
exceptions to the warrant requirement.56 In particular, four
categories have been invoked frequently to justify these seizures:
(1) seizures based upon consent, (2) seizures conducted under
exigent circumstances, (3) seizures conducted as investigatory
detentions, and (4) seizures based upon the "special needs" of
51 See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
52 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999).
1 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights Practice as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 17-19, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos.
09-1454, 09-1478) [hereinafter Brief of the Legal Aid Society].
5 See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604; Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note
53.
6 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 415.
* See id. at 461, 465-66, 469-70, 473-75.
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government agents. An examination of these four exceptions is
critical to understanding how they apply to child abuse
investigations.
1. Consensual Seizures
Consensual seizures require, at minimum, that the consent
be "valid."58  A valid consent is one made "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily."" In determining whether consent
is voluntary, courts consider the "totality of all the
circumstances," including the characteristics of the individual,
the individual's actions or statements, the environment where
the individual was asked to consent, and the actions or
statements of the seizing party.o
However, unlike many cases involving adults, obtaining
valid consent to a seizure during child abuse investigations poses
particular, often unique, difficulties.6 1  Generally, parents can
consent to seizures of their children because of the control they
have over their children as custodians. But where parents are
the suspected abusers, child protective services may attempt to
obtain the child's consent instead.
The problem is that a child generally has very limited ability
to consent." The law usually presumes that children are
incapable of making most informed legal decisions for
themselves. 5 Mature minors might be capable of consenting to
seizures under certain circumstances, but the totality of these
" See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2005); Doe
v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2003); Lane v. Milwaukee Cnty. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. Children & Family Servs. Div., No. 10-CV-297-JPS, 2011 WL 5122615, at
*5-6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011); Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs.
Child Protective Servs., Civil Action No. SA-08-CA-940-XR, 2009 WL 2998202, at
*9-10, *12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009); Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37,
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478).
68 See STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 84.
59 Id. at 13.
6 See id. at 84-85.
61 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 462 n.144.
62 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 21-22.
6 See id. at 21; see also Hafemeister, supra note 29, at 826.
6 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 462 n.144.
65 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-37 (1979).
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circumstances-including the education, intelligence, and age of
the child-must be considered when determining whether a child
consented voluntarily.6
2. Seizures Under Exigent Circumstances
Exigent circumstances provide a second possible basis for
warrantless seizures of children. Under the exigent
circumstances exception, an emergency must make a warrant
impracticable at the time of the seizure, and the seizure must be
based upon probable cause. This exception reflects the reality
that there are true emergencies during which it is not reasonable
to expect a government agent to take the time necessary to
obtain a warrant prior to conducting a seizure.68  Exigent
circumstances include situations in which "a person's life or
safety is threatened; a suspect's escape is imminent; evidence is
about to be destroyed or removed; or some other consequence
improperly frustrates legitimate law enforcement efforts."
Courts have generally found this exception applicable to
child abuse investigations. 0 For example, when a child has been
abused so severely that the child's health and safety is at
imminent risk, courts have allowed child protective workers and
law enforcement officers to enter a child's home and remove the
child without a warrant.7 ' These courts have held that the
state's substantial interest in protecting the child from abuse and
the child's interest in being free of abuse are greatest when the
child is facing immediate danger." If the child is in imminent
danger such that there is no time to obtain a warrant, then child
protective agencies may be permitted to seize the child even
without prior judicial authorization of their actions. However,
the potential overuse of the exigent circumstances exception-
6 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 462 & n.144.
67 STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 118-19.
6 See id. at 118.
69 Id.
" See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d
395, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2002); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1999); Calabretta v. Floyd,
189 F.3d 808, 813, 816-17, 819 (9th Cir. 1999).
71 See Mark Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers
and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV. 493, 508-09 (1988).
72 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 475-76.
73 See Hardin, supra note 71.
972 [Vol. 86:963
2012] INTERVIEWING SUSPECTED VICTIMS IN SCHOOL
perhaps by well-meaning but panicked caseworkers-raises
serious issues.74 The suggestion that a child might be a victim of
abuse triggers serious, legitimate concerns.7 5  However, the
seriousness of the concern is not the end of the exigent
circumstances inquiry. The threat must be so imminent that it
would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, and probable cause
for the seizure must exist." Thus, if a child protective agency
has time to obtain a warrant or lacks sufficient evidence to
justify a seizure, then the agency may not invoke the exigent
circumstances exception.
3. Investigatory Detentions
The third category of warrantless seizures includes
investigatory detentions, which became known as "Terry stops"
after gaining recognition following Terry v. Ohio." In Terry, the
Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers may conduct a
reasonable search when they briefly detain individuals who
appear to be engaged in suspicious activity.79  The Court
recognized the impracticability of obtaining a warrant under
circumstances requiring "necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the [police] officer on the
beat."8 0 To evaluate the reasonableness of the search in Terry,
the Court looked to whether the search was "justified at its
inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."81
As a whole, Terry has come to stand for the proposition that
a brief search or seizure may be permissible if the seizing party
has "reasonable suspicion" to initiate the detention. 82  This
reasonable suspicion standard requires a lesser showing than
probable cause does. In Terry, several individuals were
detained after a police officer saw them repeatedly congregating
near a store, walking past the store, and staring in the store
7 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 465-66.
75 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 14-16.
76 See STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 118-19.
" See Coleman, supra note 28, at 464-66.
78 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 See id. at 19-20, 22-23, 30-31.
80 See id. at 20, 24.
81 Id. at 19-20.
82 See STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 97.
83 Id. at 94.
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window.' The Supreme Court held that although such behavior
did not provide probable cause to arrest, it did provide a
reasonable suspicion that the individuals were possibly engaged
in criminal activity." Additionally, the officer's detention of the
individuals on this basis was brief." Thus, the stop was
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 7
In the years following Terry, the courts have cut back on the
reach of the Terry stop, such that lengthier "stops" may not be
justified on the lower standard of reasonable suspicion. 8 When
an investigatory detention continues beyond the period of time
necessary to resolve the "reasonable suspicion" that motivated
the stop, these courts have held that a search or seizure might no
longer be reasonable and should therefore be supported instead
by probable cause."
Investigatory detentions have not been widely considered in
the context of child abuse investigations, but at least some
authority suggests that the standards governing these
investigatory detentions might apply. 0 The Tenth Circuit, for
example, analyzed a brief in-school interview of a child under the
Terry stop standard.9' In this case, a child protective caseworker
conducted a ten-minute interview of a child who allegedly abused
another child at school." The court ratified the interview, noting
that the Terry stop standards-that the stop be justified at its
inception and reasonably related in scope to the original
circumstances of the stop-were met."
"' Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
" See id. at 22-23.
8 Id. at 24-25.
87 Id. at 23, 30-31.
8 See Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC.
37, 38, 48-49, 51-52 (2005).
89 See id. at 38, 48-49.
90 See Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Lane v.
Milwaukee Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Children & Family Servs. Div., No. 10-CV-
297-JPS, 2011 WL 5122615, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011); Smith v. Tex. Dep't of
Family & Protective Servs. Child Protective Servs., Civil Action No. SA-08-CA-940-
XR, 2009 WL 2998202, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009).
9 See Bagan, 41 F.3d at 574 n.3.
9 Id. at 574.
93 Id. at 574 n.3.
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4. Seizures Based upon the "Special Needs" of State Agencies
The fourth category, consisting of seizures that are justified
by the "special needs" of administrative agencies, is one of the
most recently developed and controversial categories of
warrantless seizures. Under this exception, if an
administrative agency has a special need to conduct a seizure in
the course of its regulatory activities, it may do so if the need is
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement."" Under such
circumstances, courts have required mere "reasonable suspicion,"
rather than probable cause, to justify a seizure.9 6
The Supreme Court applied this exception in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., in which the Court upheld a public school administrator's
warrantless search of a student's purse.97  The purse was
searched after the student was found smoking in the bathroom,
and the search revealed that the student was carrying
marijuana. The Court found the search to be justified, stating
that a school's special needs include "the preservation of order
and a proper educational environment."99 In order to meet those
needs, the Court continued, a school requires "close supervision
of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an
adult."0 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment still
applies to schools, but that this warrantless search was
reasonable at its inception because of the school's administrative
interest in "maintaining security and order" within the school. 01
" STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 127. Although some sources treat the
larger category of seizures justified by "special needs" distinctly from the category of
administrative warrantless seizures, see, e.g., Warrantless Searches and Seizures,
supra note 88, at 111, 116, the author of this Note-like Stephens and Glenn-will
use the terms interchangeably, since this Note is concerned only with "special needs"
in the particular context of seizures conducted by child protective services
(administrative) agencies, cf STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 127-28; JOEL
SAMAHA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 242 (8th ed. 2012) (including "administrative"
seizures within a larger discussion of "special needs" seizures).
" See STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 127-28.
9 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985).
9 Id. at 340-43.
98 Id. at 328.
9 Id. at 339-40.
1oo Id.
1o1 Id. at 338, 340, 343.
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Under these circumstances, the school administrator only needed
"reasonable grounds" to believe that the student was "violating
either the law or the rules of the school" to conduct the search.10 2
The federal circuit courts are split over whether the special
needs exception should apply to warrantless searches and
seizures in child abuse investigations. 103  The Fourth and
Seventh Circuits-which favor applying the exception-have
held that child protective agencies have special needs to conduct
such seizures as part of their administrative responsibilities in
protecting children.104 On the other hand, the Ninth, Fifth,
Tenth, and Third Circuits have found that these needs do not go
"beyond the normal need[s] for law enforcement," as required;
they argue that law enforcement activities are so entangled in
child abuse investigations that the two are essentially
inseparable.'1 The Second Circuit has taken a middle-of-the-
road approach, declining to adopt a categorical rule that the
special needs exception applies, but noting that "[t]here may be
circumstances in which the law of warrant and probable cause
established in the criminal setting does not work effectively in
the child removal or child examination context."10 6
II. WARRANTLESS IN-SCHOOL INTERVIEWS OF SUSPECTED
VICTIMS OF CHILD ABUSE
With the necessary background on the Fourth Amendment
now established, this Part examines the current controversy
surrounding a particular investigatory tool in child abuse
investigations-interviews of suspected victims in schools. Part
II.A discusses the competing interests at stake in the controversy
over whether and how these interviews should be conducted in
light of Fourth Amendment concerns. Part II.B discusses how
this controversy recently reached the Supreme Court in Camreta
102 Id. at 341-42.
103 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 473-75.
104 Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1993); Darryl H.
v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900-02 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1024-30 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d
395, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2002); Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993); Good
v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092-94 (3d Cir.
1989).
10 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999).
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v. Greene,107 but was left unresolved. Part II.C shows how lower
courts have answered the Fourth Amendment questions
surrounding these interviews. Part II.D discusses the impact of
the current state of this controversy on child protective agencies
and on the rights of the children that these agencies interview.
A. The Controversy Surrounding In-School Interviews
In-school interviews of suspected victims of child abuse
reveal a fundamental tension between the Fourth Amendment
rights of children and the need to protect these children from
abuse. 0 8  On the one hand, these interviews are usually
conducted in the absence of parental consent and a warrant,
raising serious Fourth Amendment concerns. 09 The child in
school may not know or be able to recognize what her rights are
during the interview."10 She may feel compelled to answer any
questions asked, regardless of whether or not she understands
the gravity of the answers or would prefer not to answer."'
On the other hand, such interviews may more effectively
protect children from abuse. Children who are interviewed in the
home may be subject to the influence of family members who
pressure them to hide the abuse, and in-school interviews may
remove children from this influence.11 2 They may also prevent
the abuser from knowing of the interview in advance and thus
coaching or threatening the child to answer in a particular
way."13 Children may also be more at ease in the familiar school
environment than elsewhere. For these reasons, several states
have statutes listing schools among the locations where child
1' 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2011).
108 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 415-18.
109 Id. at 465-66.
110 Cf LAWRENCE F. Rossow & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 77-79 (3d ed. 2006) (describing a "coercive" search
by school officials, in which students were repeatedly threatened that a warrant
would be obtained from the police if they resisted the search).
CI Of id. (describing a case in which children felt compelled to comply with
school officials' demands during a search because the children were "[a] ccustomed to
receiving orders and obeying instructions from school officials," so much so that they
"were incapable of exercising unconstrained free will" during the search).
112 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 28; Coleman, supra note
28, at 438.
n1 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 438.
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abuse investigations may be conducted.'1 4 The tension between
the advantages of these interviews and the risk that they violate
children's Fourth Amendment rights has given rise to a
controversy regarding whether and under what circumstances
child protective agencies should conduct these interviews.1
B. Reaching the Supreme Court: The Controversy of In-School
Interviews in Camreta v. Greene
The Supreme Court recently examined this controversy-but
ultimately left it undecided-in Camreta v. Greene."" In
Camreta, the Court was confronted for the first time with the
question of whether an in-school interview of a nine-year-old girl
regarding suspected abuse constituted a seizure, and, if so, what
Fourth Amendment protections should have applied."' However,
the Court did not reach the merits of the claim, holding instead
that the case was moot since the child had since moved out of
state and was about to turn eighteen.11 s Accordingly, the issue,
long brewing in the circuit courts and of critical importance to
the daily operations of child protective agencies across the
country, remains undecided.
In Camreta, a caseworker, accompanied by a law
enforcement officer, interviewed the nine-year-old child, S.G., in
her school for somewhere between one and two hours." 9 The
interview took place several days after the caseworker learned
that the girl's father had been released home on bail following his
arrest for sexually abusing a seven-year-old boy.120 Neither the
social worker nor the law enforcement officer obtained a warrant
114 See id. at 438 n.57 (citing statutes from California, Michigan, and Georgia
that encourage in-school interviews of children during child abuse investigations).
n" See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2005); Doe
v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 513-15 (7th Cir. 2003); Lane v. Milwaukee Cnty. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. Children & Family Servs. Div., No. 10-CV-297--JPS, 2011 WL 5122615, at *5
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011); Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. Child
Protective Servs., Civil Action No. SA-08-CA-940-XR, 2009 WL 2998202, at *9-11
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009).
116 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
117 Id. at 2026-27.
us See id.
H9 Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1016-17 & n.1 (noting that there was disagreement
between the parties regarding the length of the interview).
120 Id. at 1016.
978 [Vol. 86:963
2012] INTERVIEWING SUSPECTED VICTIMS IN SCHOOL
prior to the interview.12' The Ninth Circuit held that S.G. had
been seized without a warrant, in violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights. 122
The Ninth Circuit examined which Fourth Amendment
standards apply to such seizures.12 3 The court held that in-school
interviews generally require a warrant.124  The court also
acknowledged, though, that a warrantless interview might be
justified in the presence of exigent circumstances or parental
consent; however, since the child's parents had not consented,
and exigent circumstances did not exist-as the caseworker had
chosen to wait several days before conducting the interview-
neither exception applied and the seizure was unlawful.125
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of
Camreta, the questions that the Justices posed during oral
argument offered important insights into key issues of the in-
school interview controversy. First, the Court questioned
whether these interviews were seizures and, thus, subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.126  When Camreta
reached the Supreme Court, the parties conceded that a seizure
121 Id. at 1017.
122 Id. at 1022, 1030.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 1030.
125 Id. at 1030 & nn.17-18. Even though the court found that the seizure was
unconstitutional, it nonetheless granted the caseworker and police officer qualified
immunity for their unlawful actions and thus found them not liable. Id. at 1031-33.
The court reasoned that the child's rights in these types of interviews had not been
"clearly established" prior to the interview in question. Id. It explicitly stated,
though, that its present holding regarding the standards applicable to in-school
interviews of child abuse victims would be binding precedent that would prevent
future state actors from claiming qualified immunity in these situations. Id. at
1021-22, 1033. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ability to hold that
in-school interviews are seizures even while finding the defendants not liable.
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030-32 (2011). However, because the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment issue in Camreta was moot, the Court vacated
the Ninth Circuit's decision. See id. at 2026-27.
126 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 45-46, 57. Justice Scalia
stated:
I was asking you about whether there has been a seizure.
... Now, true in this case it was already conceded, but you're asking us to
adopt a rule for future cases, and we can't adopt a rule for future cases
until we know what we're talking about when ... we talk about a seizure.
Id. at 45-46. Justice Sotomayor also remarked, "I'm not quite sure why you
stipulated to a seizure in this case, but that was your strategic choice." Id. at 57.
These comments imply that at least some doubt might exist on the high court as to
whether these interviews should, in fact, constitute seizures.
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occurred, but the Court questioned why this concession had been
made, suggesting that the issue might not have been so easily
settled.127 Second, the Court had concerns about whether
warrantless seizure exceptions might apply. Assuming,
arguendo, that the interview was a seizure, the Court suggested
several possible grounds upon which a warrantless interview
might be justified, including consent,128 the exigent
circumstances exception,129  the investigatory detention
standard,' and the special needs exception.13 ' The Court had
numerous questions about each of these possibilities and seemed
receptive to the notion that at least some of them might apply to
in-school seizures.13 2
C. In-School Interviews in the Lower Courts
Lower courts confronted with cases involving in-school
interviews of suspected child abuse victims have adopted
different approaches to address these Fourth Amendment
concerns. At least three federal circuit courts have held such
interviews to be seizures and offered standards to determine
their constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. Other
lower courts have adopted contrary views regarding whether the
Fourth Amendment governs these interviews and, if so, what
analysis applies.
127 See id. at 45-46, 57.
128 See id. at 36. For example, Justice Alito asked, "Well, on the issue of consent,
do you read the Ninth Circuit's opinion as having an age limit? Suppose that the
child is, let's say, 16 years old. Is the child at 16 incapable of consenting to
questioning?" Id.
129 See id. at 32, 37-38. Justice Ginsburg stated, "I was under the impression
that [the Ninth Circuit] did say there's only three ways [to conduct an in-school
interview of a child abuse victim]: One is you get a warrant; another is you get
parental consent; and a third is exigent circumstances." Id. at 32.
30 See id. at 35. Justice Scalia stated, "[You're asking us to adopt a rule for the
future that says if [the interview is] very brief, it's okay, but if it's longer it isn't
okay." Id.
131 See id. at 38-41. The Court repeatedly inquired whether the presence of
various types of individuals at an interview-such as a caseworker, a police officer, a
school official, or a school nurse-alone or in tandem, would impact the analysis. See
id. This questioning suggested a concern regarding the applicability of the special
needs exception to seizures that may or may not extend beyond the typical needs of
law enforcement. See id.
132 See id. at 25, 33-46, 54-55.
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In one of the earliest cases to reach the federal circuits on
this question, the Seventh Circuit held that an interview of a
suspected child abuse victim in a private school constituted an
illegal seizure in the absence of a warrant, probable cause,
consent, exigent circumstances, and special needs. 3 3 In this
case, two caseworkers went to the school to question the child,
John Doe Jr., about allegations that school officials were
inflicting corporal punishment on students.134 The caseworkers
did not notify the child's parents prior to going to the child's
school.a5 When the caseworkers were finally admitted to the
school over the school's protests, John was escorted from his
classroom to the nursery of the school and interviewed for twenty
minutes about the suspected abuse.'
The Seventh Circuit held that John had been illegally
seized.137  The court found that John had a reasonable
expectation of privacy on the premises of the private school and
that, therefore, the seizure required a warrant and probable
cause, unless consent or exigent circumstances-or perhaps
special needs-were present.'38  However, the Seventh Circuit
expressly predicated its ruling on the fact that the interview took
place at a private school, on privately-owned property.13 9 The
Court noted that a lower standard of Fourth Amendment
protection might apply in a public school setting because an
intrusion at a public school would probably be more "limited"
than one that takes place on private property.14 0
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit similarly held that an in-
school interview of a suspected child abuse victim constituted an
illegal seizure. In Jones v. Hunt, a sixteen-year-old girl notified
school authorities that her father and stepmother had struck her
repeatedly during a fight.'4 ' After this disclosure, a police officer
removed the child from her school for an interview with a social
worker at the sheriffs department.142 The child's mother then
133 Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2003).
131 Id. at 500, 502.
131 Id. at 502.
136 Id. at 502-03.
1' Id. at 510, 513-14.
138 Id. at 511-14.
13 Id. at 511-12, 514.
140 Id. at 513-14.
141 410 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2005).
142 Id. at 1224.
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filed for-and received-a temporary restraining order against
the child's father. 4 s However, two child protective workers
subsequently told the child that, despite the temporary
restraining order, she had to return to live with her father.1"
The same caseworkers came to the child's school and met with
her in the guidance counselor's office for approximately three
hours, until the child finally agreed to return to her father. 14 5
The Tenth Circuit held that the child's encounter with the
caseworkers in the guidance counselor's office was an unlawful
seizure.4  The court rejected the relaxed standards applied to
seizures under the special needs exception, stating that such
standards should not apply where a student was questioned in
school by a social worker and a police officer.'4  The court found
that the concerns present for school officials in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.-the interests in maintaining order and discipline within
a school-were not present in a child abuse investigation."'
However, the court did not go further and articulate clear
standards for the future. 4 9 Instead, the court simply found that
the conduct of the caseworkers in this case failed even the "most
minimal standard" of Fourth Amendment review.5 0  In a
footnote, the Tenth Circuit noted that the circumstances of this
case were unique and that probable cause, a warrant, or exigent
circumstances were not necessarily required every time a social
worker questioned a child on public school property.'
While they may disagree on which exceptions to the warrant
requirement apply to in-school interviews of suspected child
abuse victims, the circuit courts do seem to agree that at a
minimum these interviews are, in fact, seizures. However, at
least one lower federal court has held otherwise. In Cornigans v.
Mark Country Day School, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found that no Fourth Amendment rights
were implicated when a police officer and a child protective




'4 Id. at 1226-29.
147 See id. at 1228.
148 See id.
149 See id. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 698 (10th Cir. 1990)).
150 Id.
"' See id. at 1228 n.4.
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suspected child abuse. 5 2 The court predicated its finding on the
fact that the child had not been physically removed from the
school itself."
Still other district courts have assumed that in-school child
abuse interviews are seizures, but applied different standards of
Fourth Amendment review than those relied on by the circuit
courts.154 In the Eastern District of Wisconsin, for example, a
police officer conducted an in-school interview of a young boy who
was suspected of being abused by his mother.' 5 In finding this
seizure to be constitutional, the court seemed to rely on the
standards governing investigatory detentions; the court found
that the interview was justified at its inception and narrow in
scope since it was short and conducted on public school grounds
with the permission of school officials.1 6  In another case, the
District Court of the Western District of Texas adopted a similar
approach when it determined that an in-school interview of a six-
year-old girl, whose father was suspected of sexually abusing her,
was a lawful seizure.'5 7 The court here noted that the interview
was not unreasonable in length and applied a "reasonable
suspicion" standard to find that the grounds for the seizure were
justified. 5 s
D. The Consequences of the Controversy for Child Protective
Agencies and Children
The ambiguity surrounding what standards govern in-school
interviews of suspected child abuse victims has left child
protective agencies in a state of uncertainty and encouraged
misuse of this investigative tool.' Most agencies have not
152 No. CV 03-1414(DLI)(WDW), 2006 WL 3950335, at *1-2, *6 (E.D.N.Y. July
12, 2006).
153 Id. at *6.
" See Lane v. Milwaukee Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Children & Family Servs.
Div., No. 10-CV-297-JPS, 2011 WL 5122615, at *5 & n.5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011);
Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. Child Protective Servs., Civil
Action No. SA-08-CA-940-XR, 2009 WL 2998202, at *8-9, *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15,
2009).
"' Lane, 2011 WL 5122615, at *4.
156 Id. at *5.
117 Smith, 2009 WL 2998202, at *7, *11.
158 Id. at *11.
159 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 466 n.159. While a number of states have
implemented policies authorizing in-school interviews of children during abuse and
neglect investigations, very few states have provided any-let alone clear-
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seemed particularly concerned with establishing clear standards
of their own, in part because of the prevalent use of the qualified
immunity doctrine in litigation."so Under this doctrine, a
government actor may be relieved from liability for violating a
constitutional right if the right was not "clearly established" at
the time of the violation.1 6' Ironically, by failing to establish
procedures to protect children's Fourth Amendment rights
during seizures, agencies might more easily avoid liability when
children's rights are violated because these rights are not "clearly
established."'62 Without clearly established standards, agencies
"can carry out their own changing and idiosyncratic policies
regarding searches and seizures, and gain [unfair advantages in
subsequent] litigation, when they act unilaterally rather than
expose their decision-making to judicial review."'6 3
The policies of child protective agencies in Texas and
Connecticut illustrate this weakness.164  Both states' agencies
have written policies regarding in-school interviews of
standards aimed at protecting children's Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., CONN.
DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, POLICY MANUAL § 34-3-5 (2000), available at
http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2639&Q=393950 (stating that the investigator
may meet with the child at his school, and describing the conditions under which
these interviews may be conducted); CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS. ADMIN, D.C. CHILD
& FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, INVESTIGATIONS PRACTICE OPERATIONS MANUAL 41,
65 (2011), available at http://cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/About+CFSA/Who+We+Are/
Publications/Investigations+POM (stating that if the family being investigated is not
home, the caseworker must go to the child's school to interview the child, and that
the child's school is an example of an ideal neutral setting in which to interview a
child); CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., KAN. DEP'T OF SOC. & REHAB. SERVS., POLICY
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL § 2141 (2013), available at http://content.dcf.ks.gov/
PPS/robohelp/PPMGenerate (instructing schools to cooperate with law enforcement
and child protective agencies investigating child abuse, not to notify children's
parents of in-school interviews, and to remove children from their classrooms for
interviews without disclosing the purpose of the interview); TEX. DEP'T OF FAMILY &
PROTECTIVE SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES HANDBOOK §§ 2361-2361.1
(2012), available at http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/CPS/Files/CPS.pg-2360.
asp#CPS_2360 (stating that the alleged victim of child abuse may be interviewed at
school, and listing steps to access the child in school in the presence or absence of
parental consent).
160 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030-31, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009),
vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Coleman, supra note 28, at 466 n.159.
161 See Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1030-31; Coleman, supra note 28, at 466 n.159.
162 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 466 n.159.
'6 Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 9.
'6 See CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 159; TEX. DEP'T OF
FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 159.
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children,1 65 but these policies raise serious concerns about
whether children's Fourth Amendment rights are being
adequately upheld. In Texas, the policies seem to encourage
child protective workers to avoid the traditional safeguard of
these rights-the warrant requirement.1 66  The policy tells
caseworkers that they may seek a court order to interview a child
in school only if they "cannot obtain entrance" to the school,
which suggests that the caseworker must first attempt to enter
the school without prior judicial authorization. 6 1 In Connecticut,
school interviews of a child require parental consent-unless the
parent is the suspected perpetrator. 6 s Given that approximately
seventy-eight percent of abusers are the biological parents of
abused children,"' this exception swallows the rule. Where the
parent is the suspected perpetrator, the interview may be
conducted as long as a "disinterested adult" is present or exigent
circumstances exist when a disinterested adult is not available.170
However, the policy does not explain what role this "disinterested
adult" plays in these interviews, 171 and the mere presence of a
disinterested adult does not seem in any way to guarantee that a
child's Fourth Amendment rights are being protected.
These deficiencies in agency standards cannot be ignored.
Child protective workers deal with Fourth Amendment issues in
their investigations on a daily basis-perhaps even more
frequently than law enforcement officers do.17 2 If child protective
agencies are to make use of in-school interviews to protect
children while preserving children's Fourth Amendment rights,
then a clear rule must be established.
165 See CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 159; TEX. DEP'T OF
FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 159.
166 See TEX. DEP'T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 159, § 2361.
167 See id.
168 See CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 159.
169 See Hafemeister, supra note 29, at 826.
170 See CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 159.
171 See id.
172 N. Dickon Reppucci & Carrie S. Fried, Child Abuse and the Law, 69 UMKC
L. REV. 107, 120 (2000).
985
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
III. DEFINING THE RULE: FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
APPLIED TO IN-SCHOOL INTERVIEWS
This Part proposes clear standards to govern in-school
interviews of suspected child abuse victims so that interviews are
conducted in a manner consistent with children's Fourth
Amendment rights. Part III.A argues that in-school interviews of
suspected victims of child abuse constitute seizures. Part III.B
discusses how, as seizures, these interviews are generally subject
to the requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause.
Part III.C analyzes possible exceptions to the warrant
requirement and argues that consent or the exigent
circumstances exception may justify warrantless interviews, but
the investigatory detention standard and special needs exception
will not. Part III.D demonstrates how these rules answer the
unresolved questions the Supreme Court posed during oral
argument in Camreta. Part III.E shows how this framework may
be incorporated into child protective agencies' policies to provide
clearer guidelines for those investigating abuse.
A. In-School Interviews Constitute Fourth Amendment Seizures
The Supreme Court's questioning during oral argument in
Camreta notwithstanding, substantial circuit court authority
supports the proposition that an in-school interview of a child
regarding suspected abuse is a seizure. The majority of federal
circuits have held that various investigatory techniques applied
during child abuse investigations constitute seizures, 7 3 and at
least three circuits have found that in-school interviews of
suspected victims specifically are seizures. 74 For example, in
Doe v. Heck, the Seventh Circuit held that a caseworker's in-
school interview of a fourth-grade boy about potential abuse
constituted a seizure."'7  The child had been taken from his
classroom by the school principal, caseworkers, and a uniformed
police officer to the nursery of the school, which was empty at the
time.7 6  He was questioned there for twenty minutes about
"I See Coleman, supra note 28, at 471.
174 Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 131
S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2005); Doe v.
Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003).
175 Heck, 327 F.3d at 503, 510.
16 Id. at 510.
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whether he had suffered abuse."'7  The Seventh Circuit found
that the child had been seized, because no reasonable child would
have believed he was free to leave the nursery under those
circumstances. 178
The Tenth Circuit similarly found that a high school student
was seized when she was taken to the school counselor's office
and questioned by two government officials. 7 9 In Jones v. Hunt,
two caseworkers came to the school of a sixteen-year-old girl
after telling her that she would have to return home to her
abusive father, despite a temporary restraining order against
him.8 o They proceeded to interview her for over two hours in the
school guidance counselor's office while the counselor was
present and then for an additional "hour or two" after the
counselor left.' 8' Pointing to the girl's emotional vulnerability
and her knowledge of the caseworkers' power to affect her
custodial arrangements, the Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable
sixteen-year-old would not have felt able to leave such a
situation.'82 The court also noted that the girl had been sent to
the counselor's office by a school official and that "[a] reasonable
high school student would not have felt free to flaunt a school
official's command, leave an office to which she had been sent,
and wander the halls of her high school without permission."188
The reasonable belief that one is unable to leave a detention
by a state actor is a defining feature of a seizure of one's
person.18 4  The cases discussed above demonstrate that, under
the conditions of an in-school interview regarding abuse, a
reasonable child does not feel free to leave such an interview and
thus is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Jones demonstrates that when
authority figures question children in the school setting, children
feel they must stay and respond because of the typical rules of
authority and discipline that are enforced within a school.8'
Children are afraid not to cooperate with authorities within the
17 See id.
178 Id.
179 Jones, 410 F.3d at 1226-27.
180 Id. at 1224.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1226.
18 Id. at 1227.
8 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 & n.16 (1968).
18" See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1227; Rossow & STEFKOVICH, supra note 110.
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school for a variety of reasons, including school disciplinary
procedures.18 6 Children in these interviews may feel compelled to
answer-and even answer falsely-any questions they are asked,
because they believe that giving their questioners the answers
they "want" or expect is the only way to exit an intimidating
situation. 87
Even brief detentions of children in this context constitute
seizures. During oral argument in Camreta, the respondent
suggested that the length of an interview might somehow affect
the analysis of whether a seizure had occurred.' 8 However, even
investigatory detentions are seizures; the length of the detention
affects the reasonableness of the seizure, not the existence of a
seizure.'** Brief detentions constitute seizures of a person as
long as the seized party does not feel free to leave the
encounter.190
B. A Warrant Requirement for In-School Interviews of Suspected
Victims ofAbuse
Since these interviews constitute Fourth Amendment
seizures, in most cases the general requirement of a warrant
supported by probable cause applies. In determining whether
probable cause exists in the child abuse context, courts will
examine whether there are "reasonable ground[s]" to believe a
person has abused or neglected a child. 9' Probable cause can be
described, essentially, as "the difference between 'something may
have happened' and 'something probably happened.' "192 Thus, a
mere report of abuse will almost always not be enough;
186 See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1227; RosSow & STEFKOVICH, supra note 110.
I' See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Jones, 410 F.3d at 1227; Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th
Cir. 2003).
11 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 33-35. During the
respondent's argument, Justice Alito asked, "What is there in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion . .. to suggest that the length of the interrogation was relevant to their
decision?" Id. at 33. After being pressed further by Justice Scalia, the respondent
stated that the length "goes to the question of whether or not there was a seizure."
Id. at 34-35.
189 See STEPHENS & GLENN, supra note 43, at 94-96.
190 See Clancy, supra note 35, at 621-22; Hardin, supra note 71, at 562.
191 See Wm. Andrew Sharp, The Prosecutor's Role in Preventing Family Violence,
in CHILD ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE: LINKING THE CIRCLES
OF COMPASSION FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 273, 283 (Frank R. Ascione &
Phil Arkow eds., 1999).
192 Id.
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additional evidence will have to be present, increasing the
likelihood of the veracity of the report.19 3 Once child protective
agencies have sufficient evidence to demonstrate the reliability of
the report and the probability of abuse, they may seek-and
obtain-a warrant to conduct an in-school interview.'9 4
These requirements are not only consistent with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but are also particularly beneficial in
the context of child abuse investigations. Child protective
agencies are typically plagued by-and criticized for-systemic
problems that compromise their investigations, including
minimal frontline caseworker training, high employee turnover
rates, and a lack of clear operating and investigating
standards.'95 Thus, important decisions implicating children's
Fourth Amendment rights are often left solely to the discretion of
inexperienced, undertrained caseworkers and their overworked
supervisors.196 The warrant requirement takes discretion away
from these child protective workers and replaces it with a
straightforward rule: obtain a warrant before conducting an in-
school interview. 9 7
Review by a neutral magistrate also ensures that the
evidence child protective agencies gather provides sufficient
constitutional grounds to conduct the interview.' By providing
this additional level of review before a caseworker conducts an
interview, the warrant requirement "makes a fundamental
contribution to the proper resolution of the tension among the
interests of the child, the parents, and the State" in child abuse
investigations.'99 Ultimately, this requirement encourages
improved investigations by mandating that agencies impose
safeguards within their procedures that will protect the Fourth
Amendment rights of children.20 0
193 Id.
'1 Michael P. Farris, The Fourth Amendment's Impact on Child Abuse
Investigations, HSLDA, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.hslda.org/research/docs/200404020.
asp.
195 See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The
Constitutional Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 961-62 (2004);
Coleman, supra note 28, at 466 n.159.
196 See Brown, supra note 195.
197 See Hardin, supra note 71, at 561.
" See id.
199 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999).
200 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 14-16.
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C. Proposed Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement for In-
School Interviews
Although a warrant should generally be obtained prior to an
in-school interview of a child, there certainly will be some
circumstances in which it would be "reasonable" for the seizure to
occur in the absence of a warrant. This Section examines four
categories of warrantless seizures that have been proposed to
justify warrantless in-school interviews of child abuse victims-
consent, exigent circumstances, investigatory detentions, and
special needs 201-and evaluates their applicability to these
interviews.
1. The Consent Exception and Its Limited Applicability to In-
School Interviews
Consent might be a valid ground to justify a warrantless in-
school interview of a child, but the exception should only apply
under limited circumstances. Parents generally have the ability
to consent to warrantless seizures of their children.2 0 2 However,
in situations involving suspected parental abuse, caseworkers
will generally not seek parental consent, as one of the main
rationales for conducting in-school interviews is precisely to
avoid parental interference.20 3
In this context, then, the caseworker must obtain the child's
consent, but a child's ability to consent in inherently limited.204
Because of the law's presumption that children are unable to
make legal decisions for themselves, in many cases a child's
"consent" to answer questions during an interview could be
considered invalid.2 05 In some instances, "mature" children may
be able to validly consent to interviews; however, determining
whether a child is sufficiently "mature" is essentially a
201 See, e.g., Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as
moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1227-28 (10th Cir.
2005); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2003); Lane v. Milwaukee Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. Children & Family Servs. Div., No. 10-CV-297--JPS, 2011 WL
5122615, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011); Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Family &
Protective Servs. Child Protective Servs., Civil Action No. SA-08-CA-940-XR, 2009
WL 2998202, at *9-10 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009); Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 57.
202 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 21.
203 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 438.
204 See id. at 463 n.144.
20 See id.
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discretionary call that involves weighing the age, education, and
intelligence of a child."0 If consent to an interview is challenged
in court, a judge might plausibly disagree with a caseworker's
finding of maturity and hold the consent invalid. 07
One good indication of consent might be if the child-rather
than an outside third party-initiated the investigation. If a
child, uninfluenced by others, is the one who initially reports the
abuse-thus prompting an interview-there exists a more
substantial rationale for concluding that the child wishes to be
interviewed about the report.2 08 Consent is not so
straightforward, however, when the child has not initiated the
report, but is instead initially approached by others within the
school setting.0 Children typically have a low expectation of
privacy concerning school-related matters because schools are
afforded latitude to maintain order and discipline; thus, for
example, schools may conduct searches as long as they serve the
school's administrative interests. 21 0 But children are entitled to a
higher expectation of privacy with respect to non-school related
events, including child abuse in the home, because these
interviews are unrelated to the school's administrative
interests.1 Consider the situation from the point of view of a
child facing an authority figure's questions-whatever these
questions may be about-in a school setting though: The child is
unlikely to recognize the difference between these types of
inquiries and will usually feel compelled to answer both sets of
questions, even if he does not want to answer.2 12 Under such
circumstances, caseworkers might have difficulty proving that
consent was freely and voluntarily given.
2. The Exigent Circumstances Exception: Applicable to
Interviews but Only Where Its Strict Requirements Are Met
The exigent circumstances exception may also justify a
warrantless interview of a child under very limited
circumstances. Courts considering this issue have generally
206 See id. at 462 & n.144.
207 See id.
208 See Hardin, supra note 71, at 552-53.
209 See id.
210 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
211 See Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005).
212 See, e.g., Rossow & STEFKOVICH, supra note 110.
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agreed that a child may be interviewed without a warrant when
exigent circumstances exist, although most courts have not
actually found the exception's requirements to be satisfied under
the facts of their particular cases.2 13 This acceptance of the
exception comports with the interests at stake: The State's
interest in protecting the welfare of the child and the child's
interest in being free from abuse or neglect are greatest when the
child's life or safety is in immediate danger.2 1 4
However, the exigent circumstances exception's strict
requirements of probable cause together with a genuine
emergency should significantly limit the applicability of this
exception to in-school interviews. Demonstrating a true exigency
seems particularly challenging in the in-school context because,
while the child is at school, she is usually removed from the
dangerous situation being investigated.2 1 5 This scenario is unlike
that of a home investigation where the child may be facing
immediate harm.21 6 Perhaps in situations when it is late in the
day and close to dismissal time or when the child might be
returning to an extremely dangerous situation after school, the
argument that an exigency exists might be more compelling.
However, the child protective worker would still have to show
that it was impracticable to obtain a warrant before the child left
the building for the day and that probable cause justified the
initial interview.2 17 Thus, while this exception may be applicable
to cases involving in-school interviews of children, practically it
should have only limited application.
3. The Child Interview as an Investigatory Detention:
Unreasonable, Harmful, and Impracticable
The standards governing investigatory detentions, originally
developed in Terry v. Ohio,2 18 should not be applied to in-school
interviews of child abuse victims, firstly, because the purposes of
213 See, e.g., Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 n.17 (9th Cir. 2009),
vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 513 & n.17 (7th
Cir. 2003).
214 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 464-65.
215 See Hafemeister, supra note 29, at 826.
216 See id.
217 Cf Coleman, supra note 28, at 464-65 (describing concerns that officials may
wrongfully invoke the exigent circumstances exception in child abuse investigations
where the exception's requirements have not been met).
218 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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the standards are not served when they are applied to these
interviews. The role of the relaxed standards in Terry was to
permit police officers to detain individuals engaged in suspicious
behavior before they could flee the scene or carry out their
activities.21 9 Similar concerns are not present when child
protective workers enter a school to interview a suspected victim
of abuse. In those interviews, the caseworker already knows
where the child is and what the caseworker is investigating with
respect to that child. These interviews are not part of "a
dynamic, rapidly developing investigative process" like the one
described in Terry.220 Rather, they are "pre-planned seizure[s]
that could, and should... be[] reviewed by a judge before [they]
happen[]."22 ' The child is not engaged in an activity that prompts
the caseworker's seizure or encourages flight. In Terry, relaxed
standards of Fourth Amendment protection were reasonable
because they were directly related to the legitimate objectives of
preventing crime and flight.222 Applying such standards to in-
school interviews where Terry concerns are not present
overreaches.
Moreover, adopting these standards in the context of in-
school interviews of children would incentivize a method of
interviewing children that has the potential to harm them. Such
standards would encourage caseworkers to conduct interviews in
a brief, perfunctory manner in order to avail themselves of lower
Fourth Amendment standards. However, questioning a child
about such sensitive, embarrassing, personal, and hurtful
subjects is an extremely delicate undertaking.2 2 3 Children are
often unwilling to speak at all about negative events.22 4 Being
questioned about such events in any fashion can be an extremely
traumatic experience for a child, with both short-term and long-
term effects on children's mental and emotional stability.225 One
219 See id. at 20, 22-23.
220 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 27.
221 Id.
222 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 22-23.
223 See Sharron Docherty & Margarete Sandelowski, Focus on Qualitative
Methods: Interviewing Children, 22 RES. NURSING & HEALTH 177, 180-81 (1999).
224 See Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of Young Children's
Reports: From Research to Policy and Practice, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 136, 143
(1998); Docherty & Sandelowski, supra note 223, at 177, 180-81.
225 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 417-19.
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can only imagine how this harm might be exacerbated if a
stranger approaches a child and begins questioning her in a
direct, rushed fashion about whether she has been abused.
Seizures conducted in this fashion fail the test of
reasonableness. As Justice Scalia seemed to suggest during oral
argument in Camreta, it would be absurd to expect a child
protective worker to obtain reliable information regarding subject
matter as sensitive as abuse through a brief detention."'
Interviewing a child effectively, especially about a topic as
painful as abuse, requires the interviewer to build rapport with
the child, earn the child's trust, and allow the child to open up on
his or her own terms.22 7 Without such communication, the child
will be far less likely to offer information, and the information he
volunteers will likely be less accurate.22 8 Given the significant
harm a child might suffer in exchange for this relatively minor
gain of information, such seizures are not reasonable and thus
fail to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements.2 29
4. The Special Needs Exception: Inapplicable Due to Child
Protective Agencies' Entanglement with Law Enforcement
The special needs exception must also be rejected as a basis
for a warrantless in-school interview of a child because of the
large degree of entanglement between the needs of child
protective agencies and those of law enforcement in child abuse
investigations. Child abuse investigations usually do not exist in
a vacuum; rather, they frequently involve multidisciplinary
teams of "[s]ocial workers, physicians, therapists, prosecutors,judges, and police officers."o Law enforcement typically first
becomes involved in these investigations when abuse is reported,
either by referral from an outside third party or agency or by a
direct call from an involved party.2 3 ' Since the emergence of
226 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 34 ("It seems like a very
strange rule to me. You mean it's okay for a child protection worker to just ask the
child ... [clome into this room, I have a question for you: Has your father been
abusing you?").
227 See Sara Harris, Toward a Better Way To Interview Child Victims of Sexual
Abuse, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Winter 2010, at 12, 12-14.
228 See id.
229 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 44-45.
230 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 3 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE].
231 Id. at 2.
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mandatory reporting laws, reporting of child abuse has
increased, and thus law enforcement agencies have taken on an
even greater role to meet the challenges of investigating these
many reports. 2
Once involved, law enforcement often becomes an integral
part of the investigation process. Law enforcement agencies take
on roles such as developing intake procedures with child
protective agencies, 233  providing accompaniment of child
protective workers in the field,2 34 interviewing children, 235 and
conducting criminal investigations of suspected abusers.23 6 Some
states require child protective agencies to "share all child
maltreatment reports with law enforcement ,"237 and "most if not
all states contemplate that the evidence-gathering function may
be conducted by officials from either agency, or both working
together, and that relevant evidence will be shared between the
agencies for eventual use in both civil and penal proceedings."2 8
When conducting an investigation, law enforcement and child
protective agencies are expected to work together and be aware of
each other's concerns.3
The overlapping involvement of child protective agencies and
law enforcement indicates that the needs of child protective
agencies are not beyond the normal needs of law enforcement;
rather, they are inextricably entangled with these needs, such
that the special needs exception cannot apply to child protective
agencies' investigations.24 0 If courts accepted the special needs
exception as a basis for conducting these investigations without a
warrant, there would be a serious risk that law enforcement
would obtain information from child protective agencies' seizures
that law enforcement would not be able to otherwise obtain due
232 See id.
233 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 492-93.
234 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
235 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 2.
236 David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Child Abuse Reported to the Police, Juv.
JUST. BULL. (Dep't of Justice/Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention,
Wash., D.C.), May 2001, at 1.
237 Id. at 2.
238 Coleman, supra note 28, at 493-95 (footnote omitted).
239 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230.
240 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 491-97.
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to Fourth Amendment protections.2 4 ' For this reason, child
protective agencies should be subject to the same standards that
law enforcement agencies would be subject to when conducting
child abuse investigations.2 42 Undeniably, law enforcement
agencies and child protective agencies play extremely important
roles in investigating child abuse, but the importance of these
roles alone does not mean that the agencies have "special needs"
that allow them to circumvent the constitutional requirements
governing seizures.243
The analysis of whether the special needs exception applies
to an in-school interview of a child should not hinge on whether
or not law enforcement is present for the interview; law
enforcement still potentially benefits from the information gained
by the child protective worker's interview, whether or not law
enforcement was in the room when the information was obtained.
In Camreta, the Ninth Circuit declined to answer the question of
whether the special needs exception would have applied had the
caseworker been acting alone, without a police officer present.2 *
Given the likelihood of police involvement at some stage of child
abuse investigations, whether at the interview of the child or at
another point,245 the risk that law enforcement will gain
information that it would not otherwise have been able to obtain
calls for a blanket rejection of the exception.
In addition, although these interviews take place in schools
like the search in New Jersey v. T.L.O. did, interviews during
child abuse investigations are distinguishable such that the
special needs exception that applied in T.L.O. should not apply
here.24 6 In T.L.O., the search of a student's purse was considered
reasonable because it served the school's special needs of
241 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
242 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 14 ("[Tjhe need for
judicial review is compelling no matter who is taking action.").
243 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[I]f CWA
caseworkers have 'special needs,' we do not think that freedom from ever having to
obtain a predeprivation court order is among them. Caseworkers can effectively
protect children without being excused from 'whenever practicable, obtain[ing]
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures.'" (second alteration in original)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))).
24 Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1027 n.12.
245 See Finkelhor & Ormrod, supra note 236.
246 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-42 (1985); Jones v. Hunt, 410
F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005).
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maintaining order and discipline. However, in child abuse
investigations, a different set of goals-unrelated to the school's
overall administrative scheme-is present. 248 The purpose of
conducting a child abuse investigation inside a school is to
determine whether children are in danger of abuse once back
outside of school; if so, agencies can act to protect these children
from that external danger. 24 9 The school's interests underlying
the rationale of T.L.O. are not present in a caseworker's
investigation of child abuse that occurred outside of school.
For the same reason, even if a school official-rather than an
outside caseworker-conducted an interview of a child regarding
abuse, the T.L.O. standards would still not apply. Although
school officials may have reporting requirements under state law
if they suspect a child is being abused,2 50 their specific
administrative roles do not include undertaking investigations of
this abuse; rather, "[p]ublic schools have a relationship with their
students that is markedly different from the relationship
between most governmental agencies, including [child protective
services], and the children with whom they deal."251 The school's
goals of maintaining order and an appropriate educational
environment are not achieved when the school seizes a child for
an interview regarding suspected child abuse.2 52 School officials
conducting such interviews would essentially take on the role of
the child protective agency, and the same concerns about law
enforcement wrongfully obtaining this information would be
present. Thus, the "special needs" of schools do not include the
need to conduct these interviews, and the exception should not
apply in these situations.
D. Camreta: What the Court Did Not Hold
As the preceding section demonstrates, a thorough Fourth
Amendment analysis of in-school interviews of children
conducted by child protective workers, whether or not they are
accompanied by law enforcement, indicates that such interviews
247 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-42.
248 See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1228.
249 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 433-34.
250 Rebecca Aviel, Restoring Equipoise to Child Welfare, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 401,
420 (2010).
251 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 607 (2d Cir. 1999).
252 See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1228.
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are illegal seizures unless justified by a warrant, consent, or
exigent circumstances. This section examines the specific
inquiries articulated by the individual justices during oral
argument in Camreta v. Greene2 5 1 concerning (1) whether in-
school interviews are seizures, (2) what standards might apply if
such interviews are seizures, (3) how the factual details of an
interview-such as its length and the person conducting the
interview-might affect its reasonableness, and (4) how these
standards might apply in other types of interviews with
children.25 4 This Part addresses each of these areas of inquiry in
turn.
1. The Court's Concern with Whether In-School Interviews Are
Seizures
During oral argument on March 1, 2011, the Court, from
many directions, repeatedly returned to the issue of whether S.G.
had, in fact, been seized at all. 2 55  This Note applied the
traditional Fourth Amendment tests-whether a person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the person would
feel free to leave the situation, given the circumstances-to the
particular circumstances of a child questioned about abuse in a
school setting. 256 This Note concluded that a child would be
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
such an interview, but that the child would not feel free to leave
or terminate the interview; thus, the interview would constitute
a seizure.257
The rule proposed in this Note distinguishes, though,
between child abuse interviews-which constitute seizures-and
other types of detentions that occur in schools. During oral
argument, Justice Kennedy asked the petitioner to consider the
following example:
Justice Kennedy: . . . [W]hat happens if the teacher tells-the
student is misbehaving on the playground: Go back in the
classroom. You can't-you sit there by yourself. You can't be
part of recess.
Is that a seizure?
253 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
254 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57.
255 See id. at 1, 16, 44-46.
256 See supra Part III.A.
257 See id.
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Mr. Kroger [Petitioner]: No, Your Honor, I-I disagree that that
would be a seizure, because-
Justice Kennedy: What made this a seizure?258
Under the rule this Note advocates, such actions would not
constitute seizures. Although children have substantial
expectations of privacy with respect to interviews regarding child
abuse," children have lesser expectations of privacy in matters
related to order and discipline in schools. 260 The child who acts
up on the playground, as Justice Kennedy described, would
reasonably expect her school to take disciplinary measures to
address her misbehavior.2 61  Similarly, actions like those
mentioned by Justice Breyer, in which a child is sent to the
principal after "push[ing] [another] child at recess," or where
students are kept for "5 minutes after class" for talking too
much,26 2 also would not constitute seizures. The child's
reasonable expectations of privacy in these common schoolyard
disciplinary situations distinguish them from in-school child
abuse interviews when analyzing whether a seizure has taken
place.
2. Providing Clear Standards To Govern the Constitutionality
of In-School Interviews
This Note also provides a practical response to the Court's
second area of inquiry: what standards should apply to govern
the constitutionality of in-school interviews. 26 3  Since in-school
interviews of suspected child abuse victims constitute seizures,
courts should require child protective agencies to obtain warrants
supported by probable cause prior to conducting these interviews
in most circumstances.2 " In the absence of a warrant, the
258 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 16.
259 See supra text accompanying note 211.
260 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
261 Cf id. (describing children's lesser expectations of privacy regarding school
disciplinary matters).
262 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 41-42.
263 See id. at 11, 25.
264 Justices Alito and Sotomayor questioned what standard neutral magistrates
should apply when granting prior judicial authorization for in-school interviews of
children. Id. at 52-53, 57. This Note maintains that traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence requires a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant.
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reasonableness of the interview must be considered, as Justices
Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor suggested during oral
argument in Camreta:
Justice Ginsburg: . . . [A]nd this case presents the question
about was this [seizure] unreasonable?
Justice Kennedy: Well, but I'm-I'm asking for your view of the
proper category to apply in these cases, and if it is a seizure,
then-then it's just a question of reasonableness, and we'd look
at all the circumstances.
Justice Sotomayor: . . . What's the test? Is it a question of
whether the seizure is reasonable or not?2 6 5
This Note has set out clear standards of what constitutes a
reasonable seizure in this context by analyzing what exceptions
to the warrant requirement might apply. Applicable exceptions
include interviews conducted with valid consent of the child
herself and interviews conducted under exigent circumstances.
The other two main exceptions-investigatory detentions and the
special needs exception-should not apply to in-school child
abuse investigations, as the elements justifying their application
and usefulness in other investigations are not present in child
abuse investigations. Thus, Justice Sotomayor's concern about
whether it would be reasonable for a caseworker to talk to a child
against the child's protests 26 6 would be answered in the negative;
the child would not have consented to the interview, and-unless
there was parental consent or exigent circumstances-conducting
the interview without a warrant would be unreasonable. Justice
Alito's inquiries regarding what age would be required for a child
to consent to an interview would be guided by the factors
traditionally used to analyze the validity of a minor's consent,
including age, experience, and education.
3. Increasing Certainty Through a Bright-Line Rule
By rejecting investigatory detention standards and the
special needs exception and relying instead on the bright-line
rule articulated above, this Note also purports to diminish the
26 Id. at 11, 17, 25.
26 Id. at 25 ("[What if a child is called in and says, I don't want to talk to you
without my mom; and they continue to speak to the child? Is that reasonable?").
267 See id. at 36; Coleman, supra note 28, at 462 & n.144.
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confusion resulting from the application of "soft" factors, such as
how long an interview lasts, upon a Fourth Amendment analysis
of in-school interviews. During oral argument in Camreta, the
Court expressed discomfort with the notion that such soft factors
might ultimately determine the constitutionality of an interview:
Justice Alito: What is there in the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
which-which generally requires a warrant, to suggest that the
length of the interrogation was relevant to their decision? I
mean, at least the child protective services need to decide
whether they need a warrant before they begin the questioning,
no matter how long it's going to last.
Where does it say that the length is relevant to the-to the
issue that they decided?
Ms. Kubitschek [Respondent]: Well, Your Honor, the-the
length of the questioning has been historically important to this
Court's jurisprudence. It distinguishes, for example, between a
Terry stop and a seizure....
Justice Scalia: I don't understand. It seems like a very strange
rule to me. You mean it's okay for a child protection worker to
just ask the child passing in the hall, you know, has your-or
not passing in the hall. Come into this room, I have a question
for you: Has your father been abusing you? And if the child says
yes, thank you, and the child goes, then that's okay?
Ms. Kubitschek: We would-
Justice Scalia: Because it was a short interview? 68
Under the narrow, but clear, rule this Note advocates, these
factual circumstances would have minimal-if any-impact on
the constitutionality of the interview.
For example, the length of the interview is not a prominent
consideration once the standards governing investigatory
detentions have been removed.2 6 9  In a situation like the one
Justice Scalia described, in which a child protective worker
pulled a child aside briefly to ask her whether she had been
abused,270 a court would not inquire whether this questioning
26 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 33-34.
269 The length of an interview might still play some part in the analysis of
whether an in-school interview of a child is reasonable; for example, if a child
originally consented to an interview or if the interview were conducted under
exigent circumstances, there may come a point when the interview ceases to be
"reasonable" because it has continued for an exorbitant amount of time. Such
determinations of reasonableness would probably be conducted on a case-by-case
basis.
270 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 34.
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was subject to the reasonable suspicion standard applied in
investigatory detentions. Rather, under the bright-line rule this
Note proposes, the court would consider this questioning to be
unlawful-regardless of length-absent a warrant, consent, or
exigent circumstances. Justice Sotomayor proposed a similar
hypothetical:
Child walks into the room-is taken out of their classroom,
walks into the room. The officer says: We've heard that your
mommy and daddy are doing some things to your private parts;
is that true? And the child says-9-year-old child says: I wish
somebody had asked me before. I'm so afraid of my daddy. He
does these horrible things to me.2"
Under the rule of this Note, the police officer's initial
question would also be an unlawful seizure; merely limiting the
interview to a single question would not transform it into a Terry
stop and subject it to a lower standard of Fourth Amendment
review.
Importantly, the outcome in either situation described above
might have turned out differently if the caseworker or police
officer had focused on fleshing out the details of valid consent
first, instead of trying to conduct the interview like a Terry stop.
In Justice Sotomayor's hypothetical, since the child chose to
answer the police officer's question in a welcoming and
forthcoming manner, an interview which otherwise would
probably be ruled illegal might have been transformed, through
the child's consent, into a legal one. The question would turn on
traditional consent factors, including the child's maturity and
understanding of the situation.' Under circumstances in which
a child appears to be injured or in distress, a professional in
contact with the child-such as a caseworker, police officer, or
teacher-should be able to invite the child to talk about the cause
of this harm or distress. Asking the child whether he would like
to talk about what is wrong, while making it clear that he does
not have to do so and is free to return to his classroom activities,
might be a plausible way for these professionals to invite the
child to consent to the seizure. For the consent to be valid, the
271 Id. at 37.
272 See Coleman, supra note 28, at 462 & n.144.
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professional would have to be careful to approach the child in a
non-coercive manner, and the child would have to be sufficiently
mature to understand the implications of consent.
In addition to minimizing the importance of the length of the
interview, the rule this Note advocates also minimizes the impact
of the particular type of interviewer on the Fourth Amendment
analysis. It does so by rejecting the special needs exception. For
example, during the respondent's argument, Justice Ginsburg
questioned how the presence and actions of the police officer
during the interview in Camreta might have affected the
outcome:
[T]his is initially a social worker's investigation. And you said,
when stating what the Ninth Circuit's rule was, that police are
in combination with the caseworker.
Suppose we took out-out of the picture. He didn't utter a
word in the interview. Suppose we take the sheriff, deputy
sheriff, out. The only one who comes to the school and asks to
talk to this child is the caseworker from the department of
health?273
Under the rule of this Note, it would not matter whether the
police officer in Camreta had been present at the interview with
the caseworker; child protective workers and law enforcement
officers would be held to the same Fourth Amendment standards.
Otherwise, as Justice Alito pointed out, there would be a danger
that the child protective worker-conducting an interview
alone-could simply tape his conversation and turn it over to the
police afterwards, thus allowing law enforcement agencies to
reap the benefits of information obtained under the special needs
exception, which law enforcement would not ordinarily be
entitled to.27 4
Furthermore, the analysis would not change if the
interviewer were a school employee. Following Justice
Ginsburg's inquiry above, Justice Alito asked, "[Sluppose it was
273 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 38-39. Justice Scalia also
questioned what analysis would apply if a social worker entered a school to question
"the child about something else that is going to very much harm that child[.]" Id. at
43-44. However, what that "something else" is could potentially affect the special
needs analysis; without knowing the degree of entanglement of law enforcement
with the activities of social workers in investigating the "something else," this Note
cannot comment upon what the outcome of such a case would be.
274 See id. at 40.
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the school nurse, would the answer be the same?"2 7 5 The
interview would still not fall within the special needs exception
because the purpose of such an interview would extend beyond
the school's administrative interests in maintaining order and
discipline within the school.27 6 The information obtained from
this seizure could also be passed right along to law enforcement
officials-since school officials are mandatory reporterS277
raising the same entanglement concerns already discussed above.
Justice Scalia also questioned whether the analysis would change
if the school nurse were brought in from outside the school. 7
The same considerations would apply here as well because the
school nurse would still be acting on behalf of the school.
4. Analyzing In-School Interviews of Children in Other
Contexts
The rule this Note advocates is limited to interviews that
involve questioning suspected victims about abuse; interviews
involving different subject matter would probably undergo a
separate analysis. Chief Justice Roberts questioned whether the
same standards that apply when children are questioned about
third-party abusers would apply to interviews that focused on a
student's own activities-particularly criminal activities:
Chief Justice Roberts: -do you think that the same approach
you're following here would apply if the investigation focused on
the student rather than a third party? Would in those cases a
warrant have to be obtained?
Mr. Kroger [Petitioner]: Your Honor, I think in-in those
cases, because parental consent is a viable alternative where
the allegation is a child is being abused by another child-
Chief Justice Roberts: No, no, not another child. It could be
anything. We think the child is, you know, selling drugs,
obviously not a 7-year-old, but someone else in the school is
involved in legal activity, him- or herself.279
275 Id.
276 See supra Part III.C.4.
277 See Hafemeister, supra note 29, at 851.
278 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 43 ("If you send her to the
school nurse, it's not a seizure, but if the school doesn't have a nurse and it brings in
a nurse from the outside ... then it becomes a seizure?").
279 See id. at 14-15.
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While this Note did not discuss the precise standards
governing criminal investigations of children, the specific factual
circumstances of interviews in that context might govern
whether they are treated similarly to those involving child abuse.
For instance, if students were suspected of engaging in criminal
activity on school grounds during school hours, these activities
might reasonably be expected to threaten the order of the school;
under such circumstances, the special needs exception would
probably apply as it did in T.L.O. 28 0 If, on the other hand, the
child was questioned in school about criminal activities outside of
school, there might be more reason for the standards governing
in-school child abuse interviews to apply, since the child's
expectations of privacy would be greater regarding matters
unrelated to school order and discipline.
E. Guidance for Those Conducting In-School Investigations of
Child Abuse Victims
The previous analysis demonstrates that clear standards are
crucial to ensure that child abuse investigations can take place
without violating children's Fourth Amendment rights. Several
states sought to establish standards in the wake of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Greene v. Camreta.2 81 For example, following
Camreta, Oregon child protective workers were advised not to
conduct any interviews that could potentially be viewed as
seizures.28 2 They were instructed to obtain parental consent
before interviewing children in non-emergency situations.28 3
In Washington, a new in-school interview procedure was also
implemented, which focused on obtaining a child's voluntary
consent.284 Under the Washington procedure, caseworkers were
directed to ask children if they were willing to talk at the start of
the interview and then again at various points during the
interview.2 85 Caseworkers were also told to ask school staff-in
280 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-42 (1985).
281 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
282 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 14.
283 See id.
284 Memorandum from Tammy Cordova, Interim Dir. of Policy & Practice
Improvement, Children's Admin., to Children's Admin. CPS Staff, Reg'I
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the presence of the child-where a staff member would be in the
event that the child wanted to leave, wanted to have a third
party present, or wanted to ask a question.2 86 Caseworkers were
directed to carefully note exactly what questions they asked, who
was present, and where the interview occurred. The
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys also provided
guidelines to law enforcement officers and child protective
workers to help them determine (1) whether an interview might
be a seizure and (2) whether exigent circumstances might exist tojustify a seizure in the absence of judicial authorization or
parental consent.8
While these policies were a step in the right direction toward
protecting children's rights, they still raise certain Fourth
Amendment concerns. For example, in Oregon, it is still official
policy to allow in-school interviews whenever "the worker
believes [the school] will be the best environment in which to
assure a child's safety."28 9  Despite its cautionary warning to
caseworkers following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Camreta,
the Oregon Department of Human Services has not included any
written requirements regarding a warrant, the child's consent, or
exigent circumstances in its Child Welfare Policies.o In
Washington, although the policies are more clearly defined, the
Children's Administration has stated that it does not expect the
Ninth Circuit's holding to apply to interviews of children "where
law enforcement is not present and a crime is not suspected."29 '
Thus, Washington's policies seem to operate on the assumption
that when a caseworker acts alone, the strict standards of
Camreta do not govern the interview.29 2
This Note's analysis of the Fourth Amendment concerns
raised by in-school interviews lends itself to a clear, workable set
of standards that child protective agencies can adopt to ensure
that children's rights are adequately protected. The first
standard would require agencies to acknowledge that every in-
school interview of a child regarding suspected abuse is a seizure.
286 Id.
287 Id.
m Id. at 4-5.
289 OR. ADMIN. R. 413-015-0415(5)(b)(H) (2011).
290 See id.
291 See Memorandum, supra note 284.
' See id.
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Recognizing that these interviews are seizures, agencies would
have to act carefully to ensure that they conducted interviews in
a manner consistent with children's Fourth Amendment rights.
The next policy standard would require a child protective
worker to obtain prior judicial authorization in the form of a
warrant before conducting an in-school interview, if the worker
wished to avoid or was unable to procure parental consent. The
worker would have to be prepared to present the evidence he had
already gathered to the court in order to demonstrate that there
was probable cause justifying the interview. If the court granted
the warrant, then the worker could conduct the interview within
the parameters of the warrant.
However, without a warrant, the caseworker could only
conduct the in-school interview if (1) the child was mature-
based on age, education, and intelligence-and voluntarily
consented to the interview2 93 or (2) the caseworker had probable
cause to conduct the interview and exigent circumstances
existed-specifically, the child was in such imminent danger that
there was not sufficient time to obtain a warrant before
intervening. 4 In the absence of these circumstances, the child
protective worker could not interview the child in school.
Because determining whether valid consent exists is such a
fact-sensitive inquiry, professionals who may conduct these
interviews in schools-including caseworkers, police officers,
teachers, and other school officials-should also receive training
to aid them in determining what constitutes valid consent. In
this respect, turning to the assistance of experts in child
development and psychology could be particularly useful. For
instance, many school districts in the United States employ
school psychologists '291 and every state has a school psychologist
association. 6 These professionals could aid school districts in
promulgating guidelines defining how to determine whether a
child is mature enough to consent and how to ask for a child's
consent in a non-coercive, non-suggestive manner. They could
293 See supra Part III.C.1.
294 See supra Part III.C.2.
295 See Jeffrey L. Charvat, NASP Study: How Many School Psychologists Are
There?, 33 NASP COMMUNIQU-0, Mar. 2005, http*//www.nasponline.org/publications/
cq/cq336numsp.aspx.
296 See State Associations, NAT'L ASS'N SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS,
http://www.nasponline.org/about-nasp/links-state-orgs.aspx (last visited Feb. 27,
2013).
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also help train school officials and employees in implementing
these guidelines within their schools. Child protective agencies
and law enforcement officers could similarly turn to the aid of
social workers and child psychologists-with whom child
protective agencies regularly interact during their
investigations2 97-to establish interviewing guidelines, perhaps
similar to those Washington implemented,2 9 8 to ensure that an
interview, for its entire duration, is based on valid consent.
These proposed policies should rein in the abuse of in-school
interviews and assist child protective agencies in carrying out
more consistent-and constitutional-investigations. Since only
consent and exigent circumstances may justify a seizure in the
absence of a warrant, and only in very limited circumstances,
child protective workers will be encouraged to err on the side of
caution and seek a warrant before potentially invading a child's
Fourth Amendment rights. Increased prior judicial
authorization will be key in reducing error as important
questions of constitutional rights--questions that involve
balancing the interests of the child, the parents, and the State-
are decided. 2 "9  At the same time, requiring prior judicial
authorization will also pose "no additional risk to children's
safety" because, when the child is in imminent danger, the
exigent circumstances exception will allow agencies to conduct
warrantless seizures to intervene to protect the child.3 o Through
these policies, the State can achieve its goal of keeping children
safe without sacrificing their Fourth Amendment rights in the
process.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that in-school interviews of suspected
victims of child abuse constitute Fourth Amendment seizures.
Accordingly, such interviews generally should not be conducted
unless the interviewer has obtained a warrant prior to the
interview. In the absence of a warrant or parental consent, there
are only two scenarios in which a child may be interviewed in
school about abuse: (1) when the child gives valid consent or
297 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 284-87.
2" See Brief of the Legal Aid Society, supra note 53, at 13 (citing Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999)).
3" See id.
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(2) when exigent circumstances and probable cause exist.
However, the application of these two exceptions will be
extremely limited, given the unique concerns surrounding in-
school interviews of children. This Note has also rejected the
standards applied to investigatory detentions and "special needs"
seizures in this context, as their application may violate
children's reasonable expectations of privacy and allow law
enforcement to obtain information that would normally require a
warrant to obtain. It has applied these rules to answer the
questions the Supreme Court posed during oral argument in
Camreta v. Greene and to offer clear guidelines that child
protective agencies may adopt in order to ensure that their
investigations-which are meant to protect children-neither
intentionally nor inadvertently trounce on children's Fourth
Amendment rights.
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